Criminal Merger: The War in Sinaloa Leaves Three Mega-Cartels in Mexico

More than a year after the earthquake that brought down Ismael El Mayo Zambada, the aftershocks are still being felt in Mexico. One of the most significant is how the country’s criminal landscape has shifted: three mega-cartels have emerged from alliances that keep the federal security cabinet on the alert.

MILENIO spoke with two sources from the criminal intelligence department of the security cabinet who are closely following the “war in Sinaloa.” They discussed the survival pacts that have been forged to avenge El Mayo Zambada, a 75-year-old man with more than five decades at the top of criminal power and founder of the Sinaloa Cartel.

“We’re talking about the fact that the absence of a single man, El Mayo Zambada, was capable of changing everything we knew about organized crime in Mexico and has had repercussions on the drug supply worldwide. The markets for fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine—all of that changed as a result of the betrayal of a single man. That’s how important it is,” said one of the sources consulted.

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Allies of La Mayiza

According to federal investigations, the first mega-cartel was formed between two and three weeks after July 25, when Joaquín Guzmán López, son of Joaquín El Chapo Guzmán, handed El Mayo over to the United States against his will.

From that moment on, the son who inherited the throne, Ismael Zambada Sicairos, known as El Mayito Flaco, became close to an old boss and a new boss.

First, El Mayo Zambada’s son made a pact with the Guasave Cartel, led by the elusive Fausto Isidro Meza Flores, known as El Chapo Isidro, who for years waged a deadly war against El Chapo Guzmán and Mayo Zambada himself.

Zambada Sicairos convinced Meza to put those grudges behind him and focus on the attractive idea of ​​going after his archenemy’s sons. He agreed and recommended expanding the front by joining another family: the Dámaso López family.

Likewise, the La Mayiza faction confirmed its loyalties with long-standing criminal clans, such as the Limón Sánchez family and the Cabrera Sarabia family, who continued their practice of sheltering El Mayo on their properties in the Sierra Madre Occidental and are now reportedly hiding El Mayito Flaco in the mountains, far from a lightning military operation.

“And there you have the first mega-cartel,” says the other source, while scratching a piece of paper. “It’s no small feat: La Mayiza and the Guasave Cartel, with Los Dámaso and Los Viejones. At another time, this would have been unimaginable, but it happened. And the second mega-cartel was even harder to imagine a year ago.”

Los Chapitos and their unlikely ally: the CJNG

The “war in Sinaloa” erupted on September 9, 2024, with the breaking of a silent pact: internal disputes between the Sinaloa Cartel couldn’t affect the daily lives of people outside of organized crime.

La Chapiza and La Mayiza violated that historic agreement that Monday with a series of clashes in Culiacán that led to the suspension of classes, business closures, and mental breakdowns among people caught between the bullets.

El Mayito Flaco’s faction had grown stronger and seemed to be winning the battle: in the following days, El Chapo Guzmán’s sons lost important operators: El Piyi, El 08, El H, El Tigre, La Morsa and, earlier this year, El Jando, Iván Archivaldo’s most trusted man on the air routes and the alleged organizer of the flight that took El Mayo Zambada out of Mexico.

Faced with this situation, Los Chapitos sought an alliance in January that would strengthen them. And they found it in one of the most unlikely places: 690 kilometers south along the Pacific coast, where the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) is based.

“What we know is that people from southern Sinaloa and Colima suggested that, first, they meet with people Iván Archivaldo and El Mencho trust completely to discuss a possible alliance. If there was interest and the possibility of an agreement, they would meet again, and so on, until they forged a mega-cartel,” the source says.

The man chosen by La Chapitos was Abdiel Guzmán, cousin of Iván Archivaldo and Jesús Alfredo; In response, Nemesio Rubén Oseguera, known as El Mencho, appointed Audias Flores Silva, known as El Jardinero, as his negotiator. He is a high-ranking member of the CJNG and has been considered a possible successor at the top of the cartel. He had recently held a wake for his brother, allegedly murdered in Sinaloa by a hitman from La Mayiza.

The negotiations were swift and successful. Los Chapitos agreed to share their drug trafficking routes, their weapons suppliers, and the routes used to traffic undocumented migrants through historic strongholds, such as the Sonoran Desert. In return, the CJNG offered them armed support, safe havens, and, most importantly, the protection of El Jardinero’s mob.

“Among many other things, El Jardinero can boast that he’s the man who has kept El Mencho safe from arrest in Mexico. He’s the one who prepares the escape logistics, the security rings, all of those protocols. That’s quite attractive for people like Los Chapitos, who live in hiding, but in urban environments,” the source says.

This alliance has also had other side effects: before the “war in Sinaloa,” the CJNG maintained a pact with the Tijuana Cartel. To honor its agreement with Los Chapitos, that partnership has been canceled.

Now, the so-called Arellano Félix Cartel faces possible extinction—or remaining solely as a local and weak group—against the new partner of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel.

“There you have your second mega-cartel: Chapitos and El Mencho living together in the same space. This is of enormous concern, because both factions are known for attacking the Armed Forces. This is very risky,” says the intelligence agent.

And from that second mega-cartel, the third was formed.

Third in Discord: Gulf Cartel with the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel

For decades, the drug lords of the northwest yearned for the northeastern routes. Meanwhile, El Chapo and El Mayo attempted in 2001 to conquer Tamaulipas, the gateway to Texas, with the addition of the Gulf Cartel to what the duo called The Federation, the first major drug trafficking syndicate led by Sinaloans.

The Gulf Cartel, with its then security chiefs, Los Zetas, refused to submit. In part, because they were convinced that controlling Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, and Coahuila would make them a group so large it would be difficult to swallow.

They rejected El Chapo and El Mayo’s offer and turned against them. The worst of this confrontation occurred between 2009 and 2011, when the Comarca Lagunera area, shared by Durango and Coahuila, was stained with blood by battles between the Chapitos, Mayos, Golfos, and Zetas.

But the Chapitos mega-cartel and the CJNG opened the possibility of that changing: El Mencho’s troops could easily reach the desired Tamaulipas if El Chapo Guzmán’s sons paved the way for them through Zacatecas, Aguascalientes, and San Luis Potosí, areas with a significant presence of the first mega-cartel headed by La Mayiza.

This possibility raised red flags for the Gulf Cartel, which for the first time saw a significant invasion of foreign criminals through southern Tamaulipas.

The presence of increasing numbers of Jalisco Cartel members in municipalities such as Mante, Aldama, and the capital, Ciudad Victoria, led them to evaluate the relevance of a new alliance.

This materialized in the first quarter of the year: the now-detained Ezequiel Cárdenas, known as Tormenta Junior, son of the legendary Tony Tormenta, ordered the Scorpion Group—the most powerful faction of the Gulf Cartel, representing the continuation of the Cárdenas Guillén lineage—to begin talks with representatives of the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel, the fuel theft cartel born in Guanajuato.

The Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel is a longtime adversary of the CJNG. Their hatred is as deep-rooted as it is irrational. Both groups are fighting over Pemex pipelines in the so-called Red Triangle. Any invitation to stop El Mencho’s men would be welcomed by the Guanajuato hitmen who still swear loyalty to their imprisoned leader, José Antonio Yépez Ortiz, known as El Marro.

The agreement, in this case, is that the Gulf Cartel would provide the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel with training from Colombian mercenaries, more weapons imported from the United States, and financial support, while the Guanajuato cartel promised to reinforce southern Tamaulipas and share part of the profits from fuel theft.

“This third mega-cartel worries us greatly because they have a vast international reach. They are the ones who began bringing in former Colombian soldiers to train hitmen, and we know they have pacts with other militias, such as the Kaibiles or former gang members. They are of national concern, without a doubt,” the source stated.

Three mega-cartels emerged from the “war in Sinaloa.” Three headaches, unthinkable a year ago, but which are part of the legacy of an absent Mayo Zambada, whose presence continues to terrorize the country.

Source: Milenio